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Jeroen W. P. Wijnendaele
Stilicho, Radagaisus, and the So-Called 
“Battle of Faesulae” (406 CE)
In 405 CE, an enormous barbarian confederation led by a certain Rad-
agaisus invaded Italy. The western Roman generalissimo Stilicho managed 
to overcome them near Florence in 406. Historians have treated this war 
casually, considering it as resolved successfully and soon overshadowed by 
greater conﬂ icts. However, scholarly consensus on Radagaisus’s defeat is 
largely dependent on Orosius’s testimony that describes it as the outcome 
of a Fabian strategy conducted with minimal bloodshed near Faesulae. This 
report is at odds with other sources which indicate that Stilicho struggled to 
contain Radagaisus and ultimately inﬂ icted a great slaughter on his forces 
near Florence. Orosius’s testimony cannot be accepted and internal cross-
examination reveals major inconsistencies. A careful analysis of the various 
stages of Radagaisus’s invasion has major new implications for our under-
standing of the careers of key protagonists such as Alaric, Uldin, and Sarus, 
as well as of the breach of the Rhine frontier in 406.
At the dawn of the ﬁ fth century ce, the magister utriusque militiae Stilicho’s 
position as helmsman of the western imperial government was uncontested.1 
He had brought the entire western ﬁ eld army under his sole command in pre-
vious years, and strengthened his grip over the adolescent emperor Honorius 
by marrying his elder daughter Maria to him in 398. At ﬁ rst glance, Stilicho’s 
position seemed secure, but storms were gathering on the horizon. First, he 
had to deal with an invasion of western territory by Alaric. After Stilicho 
had terminated his second Greek campaign in 397, the east had sought to 
An early version of this article was presented at the “Conﬂ ict in Late Antiquity” symposium 
organized by the University of Helsinki (18 October 2014), where I received helpful feedback from 
Hagith Sivan, Walter Roberts, and Victoria Leonard. The ﬁ nal article is a signiﬁ cantly revised case 
study from my PhD dissertation at University College Cork and has beneﬁ tted tremendously from 
sagacious comments by David Woods, Michael Kulikowski, Noel Lenski, and the anonymous peer 
reviewer.
1 On the career and policies of Stilicho in general, see: Cameron 1970; Matthews 1975, 253–83; 
O’Flynn 1983, 14–42; Janssen 2004; McEvoy 2013 141–86. Mazzarino 1942 is outdated but still 
contains valuable sections.
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conciliate Alaric by appointing him as magister militum per Illyricum. How-
ever, in the aftermath of a failed coup in Constantinople by Gainas, a diff erent 
Gothic general, Alaric found himself stranded without a legitimate command.2 
Therefore, he decided to switch potential benefactors and invaded Italy in 401 
in order to pressure Honorius’s court into granting him a similar position. 
However, Stilicho halted him twice in battle at Pollentia and Verona in 402, 
so that he was forced to retreat into western Illyricum once more, although 
he still retained a considerable force. A short period of peace then followed 
before Radagaisus’s invasion in late 405. Zosimus provides the fullest account 
of Radagaisus’s invasion in a succinct, though confused, narrative:
. .  . Radagaisus gathered four hundred thousand Celts and Germans from 
over the Danube and the Rhine and set out to invade Italy. The ﬁ rst word of 
this news confounded everyone. The cities despaired and even Rome pan-
icked in the face of this profound danger, but Stilicho, taking the whole army 
stationed at Ticinum in Liguria, which totaled thirty numeri, and as many 
auxiliaries as he could get from the Alans and the Huns, crossed the Danube 
with his whole army without waiting for the enemy’s attack, and, falling 
on the barbarian without warning, [he] utterly destroyed their whole force. 
Scarcely anyone escaped, except a few whom he accepted as auxiliaries.3
Despite what Zosimus says above, most other sources describe Radagaisus’s 
followers as Goths, and specify that he was their king.4 Scholars often explain 
this invasion as a consequence of Hunnic pressure to the east,5 but it is equally 
2  On the political crises in Constantinople during the very last years of the fourth century, see: 
Liebeschuetz 1990, 89–131; Cameron and Long 1993, 199–252; Blockley 1998a, 114–18.
3  Zos. 5.26.3–6 (trans. Ridley 1982, 113, slightly emended): Ῥοδογάῒσος ἐκ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἴστρον καὶ 
τὸν Ῥῆνον Κελτικῶν τε καὶ Γερμανικῶν ἐθνῶν ἐς τεσσαράκοντα συναγαγὼν μυριάδας εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν 
ὥρμητο διαβῆναι. Οὗ προσαγγελθεέντος ἡ μὲν πρώτη πάντας κατέπληξεν ἀκοή· τῶν δὲ πόλεων ταῖς 
ἐλπίσιν ἀπεγνωκότων, καὶ αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς Ῥώμης εἰς ἔσχατον οὔσης κινδύνου συνταραχθείσης, ἀναλαβὼν 
ὁ Στελίχων ἅπαν τὸ ἐν τῷ Τικήνῳ τῆς Λιγυστικῆς ἐνιδρυμένον στρατόπεδον (ἦν δὲ εἰς ἀριθμοὺς 
συνειλεγμένον τριάκοντα) καὶ ὅσον οἷός τε γέγονε συμμαχικὸν ἐξ Ἀλανῶν καὶ Οὔννων περιποιήσασθαι, 
τὴν ἔφοδον τῶν πολεμίων οὐκ ἀναμείνας αὐτὸς ἐπεραιώθη τὸν Ἴστρον ἅμα παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι. Καὶ 
τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσὼν ἅπαν τὸ πολέμιον πανωλεθρίᾳ διέφθειρεν, ὥστε μηδένα σχεδὸν 
ἐκ τούτων περισωθῆναι, πλὴν ἐλαχίστους ὅσους αὐτὸς τῇ Ῥωμαίων προσέθηκεν συμμαχίᾳ·
4  CIL 6.1196 = ILS 798; Oros. 7.37.4–8; Aug. Civ. Dei 5.23; Olymp. fr. 9; Paul. Nol. Carm. 21; 
Chron. Gall. 452.50; Addit. ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 406. Halsall 2007, xvii suggests that Radagaisus 
is a Latinised name rather than his Germanic original, which may have been something akin to 
Radegis or Ratchis.
5  Thompson 1948, 28; Demougeot 1951, 354; Croke 1995, 68; Wood 1998, 518; Janssen 2004, 
187; Heather 2005, 202; Halsall 2007, 208; Mitchell 2007, 199. However, note the poignant criti-
cism of Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 61 that “[Hunnic pressure] is the well-known billiard ball theory, 
the primum movens being hidden ‘in the vast plains of Eurasia.’ Nothing in our authorities indi-
cates that behind Radagaisus stood another barbarian leader whose people were pushed by still 
another one, and so on. All we know is that the Goths came from the countries across the Danube.”
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possible that the western government’s neglect of allied peoples beyond the 
frontiers may have generated a crisis that induced Radagaisus to invade in the 
hope of winning new tribute and concessions from the government.6
The evidence of the chroniclers suggests that Radagaisus arrived in Italy 
in 405, and that his ﬁ nal defeat occurred in Tuscany in late August 406.7 
He probably took the route through western Pannonia and the northern 
transalpine provinces, descending on Italy through the Brenner Pass.8 This 
helps explain Zosimus’s description of him leading an army of “Celts and 
Germans”—a classicizing reference to his recruitment of followers on both 
sides of the Danube north of the Alps.9 As argued later, this itinerary also 
helps explain the presence of Vandals and Alans in his forces. Indeed, Rad-
agaisus had very good reasons to bypass the eastern entrance to Italy. The 
imperial court had recently moved to Ravenna, and Stilicho had probably 
stationed the bulk of the palatine ﬁ eld armies close to it, not only to guaran-
tee the court’s protection, but also to monitor the western Illyrian provinces 
where Alaric still resided after his retreat from Verona in 402. The presence 
of Alaric’s Gothic army may also have posed an extra barrier preventing Rad-
agaisus’s entry by this route.10 However, he does not seem to have had any 
diffi  culty in bypassing or overrunning Italy’s northern defenses.11
The danger posed by Radagaisus to the imperial west has been down-
played by some scholars, and this is perhaps understandable given the swift-
ness of his defeat.12 Furthermore, this war was quickly overshadowed by the 
Rhine invasion of 406/407, the usurpation of Constantine III, and Alaric’s 
6  Burns 1994, 198; Elton 1996, 42; Kulikowski 2000, 326; Goff art 2006, 78–80; Halsall 2007, 
207–8. 
7  On the date, see Mazzarino 1942, 278–79 n. 3; Janssen 1994, 187 n. 1.
8  Demougeot 1951, 356 n. 19; Burns 1994, 198 n. 54. Janssen 2004, 187 n. 4 summarizes the 
older scholarship, pointing out destructive layers attested at Vindobona, Carnuntum, and Lauria-
cum. For reasons unknown, Kelly 2014, 197 states that “[a] group of Goths, led by Radagaisus, 
had crossed the Rhine near Mainz the previous winter.”
9  Heather 2005, 194. Burns 1994, 198 also suggests that some Norican limitanei might have 
joined Radagaisus. This is not impossible, though it is just as likely that these garrisons were swept 
away by Radagaisus. 
10  Demougeot 1951, 356 n. 20.
11  The fact that Radagaisus managed to enter Italy virtually unopposed from the north is not 
necessarily a critical fault of Stilicho’s. Theodosius I had already stripped many Alpine garrisons 
for his civil wars, and the mountain range was never completely manned again after 395, see Burns 
1994 105–8. This can be further deduced from Alaric’s earlier invasion of Italy, where he easily 
defeated minor opposition on the Timavus during his crossing of the Julian Alps (Claud. De bello 
Get. 562).
12  Oost 1968, 75 claims that Stilicho achieved victory “despite his inferiority in numbers.” 
Cameron 1970, 187 states that “Stilicho found the huge Ostrogothic [sic] horde of Radagaisus easy 
enough meat in 406.” MacMullen 1988, 191 similarly remarks that “Radagaisus’ Ostrogoths [sic] 
were soon annihilated by Stilicho with a fraction of that smallest army-size.”
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later sieges of Rome. However, the evidence suggests that Stilicho probably 
had to labor hard in order to defeat him. First, the sources are in agreement 
that Radagaisus’s army contained a massive number of people. As quoted 
above, Zosimus states that he had 400,000 “Celts and Germans.” Orosius 
numbers them at 200,000 but also reveals that this was “the lowest ﬁ gure 
we ﬁ nd among historians.”13 Augustine claims that “many more than a hun-
dred thousand of his army were laid low.”14 Both Prosper and the Copenha-
gen Continuation of Prosper speak of “many thousands of the Goths” being 
defeated in Tuscany.15 Finally, Olympiodorus reports that Stilicho was able 
to incorporate 12,000 of Radagaisus’s men into his army as auxiliaries.16 
Olympiodorus claims that these were his optimates, but it is probably safer to 
interpret the ﬁ gure as incorporating both the ﬂ ower of Radagaisus’s nobility 
and their warrior retinues.17 Even so, Orosius claimed that so many of his fol-
lowers were enslaved that the slave market crashed due to the abundance of 
cheap prisoners.18 It is probable that numbers of this scale—in the hundreds of 
thousands—are exaggerated, but, as will become clear, the scale of Stilicho’s 
response suggests that Radagaisus’s army did number in the tens of thousands 
at least.19
In response to the threat posed by Radagaisus, Stilicho gathered thirty 
numeri of the Roman army, together with auxiliaries from the Alans and Huns, 
in order to create a force that is usually estimated to have consisted of between 
15,000 and 20,000 men but may have been even smaller.20 Given the magni-
13  Oros. 7.37.4, 7.37.13.
14  Aug. Civ. Dei 5.23.
15  Prosp. Tiro s.a. 406; Addit. ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 406. 
16  Olymp. fr. 9.
17  Wolfram 1988, 169–70; Burns 1994, 198.
18  Oros. 7.37.16
19  Stein 1968, 249; Halsall 2007, 206. See also Lee 1993, 138, stating that “Although the astro-
nomical ﬁ gures provided by some sources must be grossly inﬂ ated, this was equally clearly an 
invasion on a grand scale which Stilicho only managed to contain with an army of thirty numeri.”
20  Bury 1923, 168: “less than 20,000 comitatenses” (followed by O’Flynn 1983, 164 n. 44). 
Demougeot 1951, 357: “20,000 hommes à peine.” Burns 1994, 198 n. 53: “something less than 
15,000 men.” Elton 1996, 211: “perhaps 10–15,000 men.” Heather 2005, 198: “at least 15,000 
men.” Halsall 2007, 207: “about 15,000 men.” De Jaeghere 2015, 302 claims that Stilicho’s army 
numbered “30,000 hommes” without elaborating on the number or evidence. The term numerus 
originally just meant a “unit,” but during the High Empire it often denoted irregular units from 
barbarian extraction under the command of Roman offi  cers. Nicasie 1998, 75 and 189 n. 15 points 
out that during the third century numeri were never very large and that we know of about sixty 
numeri from Septimius Severus’s reign with a total establishment of perhaps 20,000 men. Jones 
1964, 610 notes that from the late fourth century onwards the term could be used generically to 
describe any type of regular army unit. Elton 1996, 92–93 believes that they were roughly similar 
in size but also acknowledges that there are very few direct attestations about their numerical 
strength. Very few scholars are presently inclined to accept the once dominant view of Jones 1964, 
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tude of the crisis, it is reasonable to suppose that he mobilized troops stationed 
in Gaul, as he had done during Alaric’s invasion of Italy.21 However, he seems 
to have delayed committing this force to battle, because even as late as April 
406, he was still strenuously recruiting soldiers, and even drafted slaves into the 
army on the promise of freedom and a reward of two solidi.22 The recruitment 
of slaves in this manner, traditionally a last resort in the time of the greatest 
crisis, reveals just how desperate the situation was felt to be.23 Even then, it was 
not until late August that Stilicho dared ﬁ nally to challenge Radagaisus in the 
ﬁ eld. It is possible, therefore, that Radagaisus’s followers as a whole—women, 
children and elderly included—really did number in the low hundreds of thou-
sands. However, the proportion of combatants to non-combatants for barbar-
ian groups of this era is usually estimated at 1:4 or 1:5,24 leaving Radagaisus 
with as many as 40,000 armed men under his command—a number that the 
often careless compiler Zosimus could have boosted tenfold.25
Modern scholarship has often neglected the fact that the sources are at 
odds about how so large a force was ﬁ nally brought down. 26 Orosius claims 
that Radagaisus, together with 200,000 men, was trapped in the hills near 
Faesulae, and that these men were starved into surrender without any losses on 
679–84 that such units could number over 500 soldiers; see Tomlin 2008, 159–62 for a summary. 
Even if we suppose that Stilicho’s numeri numbered at least 300 soldiers each, and that they were 
accompanied by several thousand auxiliaries drafted from Alans and Huns, 15,000 is still a gen-
erous estimate. For these reasons, I agree with Burns 1994, 356 n. 24 and Elton 1996, 211 that 
Stilicho’s army will rather have been somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 men strong.
21  Drinkwater 1998, 275.
22  CTh 7.13.16 (issued on 17 April 406, at Ravenna). O’Flynn 1983, 159 n. 29 confusingly 
interprets this law as Stilicho’s concern that the corps of bucellarii should not become excessively 
large at the expense of the army of the state as reﬂ ected in CTh 7.13.16, and that it was intended 
to severely limit their size. The law does not say anything like this. Similarly, Heather 2003, 98 
believes that the reference to servants ﬁ ghting on behalf of barbarian auxiliaries refers to survivors 
incorporated after Radagaisus’s defeat. However, the law clearly predates the latter event. [Please 
add Heather 2003 to list of references.]
23  Elton 1996, 154; Blockley 1998a, 121; Kulikowski 2000, 330; Lenski 2009.
24  Burns 1994, 30; Heather 2005, 198. For a general consideration of the problems regarding 
inﬂ ated numbers of barbarian groups in this period, see James 2009, 184–86. 
25  Mazzarino 1942, 277 n. 4 was willing to believe that Radagaisus’s horde consisted of 400,000 
warriors, thus explaining the great slaughter of his main force, the massive enslavement of many 
others, and the incorporation of only 12,000 of his warriors. Unless we suppose that Radagaisus’s 
warriors had the most primitive equipment and no ﬁ ghting skill whatsoever, it seems impossible 
to explain how Stilicho could have defeated a force of nearly half a million with a few tens of 
thousands of soldiers. Heather 2005, 445 suggests that Radagaisus’s force originally consisted 
of 20,000 or more men. He comes to this conclusion by mainly focusing on Orosius’s account of 
Faesulae and Olympiodorus’s explanation of Stilicho’s auxiliaries. 
26  Kulikowski 2007, 171 cautiously speaks of thousands of Goths being enslaved. Lee 2007, 104 
combines Zos. 5.26.5 and Olymp. fr. 9 to state that Stilicho incorporated 12,000 of Radagaisus’s 
followers, but he fails to note that the two sources contradict each other on the number of auxiliaries. 
Fear 2010, 399 n. 448 is aware of the discrepancy in the sources but does not investigate it further. 
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the Roman side.27 Yet all the other sources speak of a slaughter during the ﬁ nal 
reckoning.28 Zosimus emphasizes that Stilicho “utterly destroyed their whole 
force. Scarcely anyone escaped, except a few whom he accepted as auxiliaries.” 
Hence we are faced with a clear contradiction between Orosius and these other 
sources. So what really happened at Faesulae, and how can one resolve the two 
contradictory traditions concerning the nature of Stilicho’s victory there?
Division and Defection of Radagaisus’s Forces
It is a recurring theme in Orosius’s history that the Christian God aided the 
Romans to gain victory without bloodshed, even when other sources clearly 
contradict this. For example, he falsely claims about the civil war between 
Theodosius I and Magnus Maximus that “no one practiced treachery .  .  . 
that most terrible war was consummated to the point of victory without 
bloodshed.”29 He also says the same about Theodosius’s victory over Euge-
nius, claiming that victory was achieved “with very little, or no, shedding of 
blood.”30 He repeatedly describes how loyalist forces won their victories as a 
result of divine intervention, when other more mundane factors were clearly 
at play. For example, he credits the victory of the loyalist Mauri commander 
Mascezel over his brother Gildo, the magister utriusque militiae per Africam 
who had revolted against Stilicho in 397–398, to advice received from the 
recently deceased bishop Ambrose of Milan who had allegedly appeared in 
a dream to him, and explicitly states that “there was no ambush, nor any 
bribery.”31 Orosius doth protest too much.
The fact remains that Gildo was abandoned by his regular army units at 
the start of the battle near the Ardalio river, and the most plausible explana-
tion of their behavior is that Mascezel had managed to bribe them during the 
three day lull before the battle.32 So too, Stilicho’s victory over Radagaisus 
is depicted as a bloodless victory because this was the sort of victory won by 
those with God on their side, or so Orosius wished his readers to believe. I 
suggest that the key to understanding Orosius’s account probably lies in the 
brief description of the same invasion by the Gallic chronicler of 452:
Radagaisus laid many cities waste before he fell: his division of his army into 
three parts under diff erent leaders opened up to the Romans some means 
27  Oros. 7.37.13–15.
28  Aug. Civ. Dei 5,23; Prosp. Tiro s.a. 406; Addit. ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 406; Zos. 5.26.5.
29  Oros. 7.35.7. 
30  Oros. 7.35.9.
31  Oros. 7.36.12. On this episode, see now: Wijnendaele, forthcoming.
32  Diesner 1963, 183; Kotula 1970, 170.
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of resisting. Stilicho wheeled around his Hun auxiliaries and annihilated a 
third part of the enemy force in a notable victory.33
That Radagaisus split his forces seems entirely reasonable: unlike the impe-
rial army, he did not possess the logistics to supply such a huge following in 
enemy territory, and thus needed to let them forage for themselves.34 However, 
the chronicler describes the destruction of only one of the three groups into 
which Radagaisus had split his forces. What happened to the other two divi-
sions? It has been suggested that these two groups could have been persuaded 
by Stilicho to leave Italy.35 Yet, given the hostility with which most ancient 
sources treat Stilicho, they surely would have made ample use against him of 
the unscathed retreat of thousands of armed barbarians!36 On the contrary, 
however, all the sources agree that the war against Radagaisus ended in total 
victory for Stilicho.
Heather suggests that behind Stilicho’s acquisition of 12,000 of Radagai-
sus’s best warriors lies “a considerable diplomatic coup, drastically cutting 
away Radagaisus’s support and ruining his chances of standing up to Stili-
cho’s army.”37 A major defection from Radagaisus’s army would certainly help 
explain how Stilicho ﬁ nally managed to defeat him in open battle. A compari-
son with the Hunnic leader Uldin’s defeat in Thrace by eastern Roman forces 
in 409 is instructive. The imperial commanders had bribed some of Uldin’s 
chiefs to defect to them before then engaging his main force in battle.38 Fortu-
nately, Orosius preserves critical information suggesting that something very 
similar happened to one of the two divisions of Radagaisus’s army, and this 
greatly aided Stilicho in his victory. Just before his description of Radagaisus’s 
invasion of Italy, Orosius inserts a crucial but often overlooked note:
I shall say nothing about the internecine ﬁ ghting between the barbar-
ians themselves, when two divisions of Goths, and then Alans and Huns, 
destroyed each other in varied acts of slaughter.39
33  Chron. Gall. 452.52 (trans. Murray 2000, 80): Multis ante vastatis urbibus Radagaisus occu-
buit; cuius in tres partes per diversos principes divisus exercitus aliquam repugnandi Romanis 
aperuit facultatem. Insigni triumpho exercitum terciae partis hostium circumactis Chunorum 
auxiliaribus Stillico usque at internicionem delevit.
34  Burns 1994, 198; Elton 1996, 77, 219; Halsall 2007, 206. 
35  Demougeot 1951, 359; Stein 1968, 250; O’Flynn 1983, 41. Blockley 1998a, 121 simply thinks 
that the “two [groups] disappear, presumably they left Italy.” 
36  See the accusations hurled against Stilicho after his downfall when Alans, Sueves, and Van-
dals ravaged Gaul: Oros. 7.38.3–4, 40.3; Chron. Gall. 452.55. 
37  Heather 2005, 206.
38  Blockley 1992, 53.
39  Oros. 7.36.6–12 (trans. Fear 2010, 397, slightly amended): Taceo de ipsorum inter se bar-
barorum crebris dilacerationibus, cum se inuicem Gothorum cunei duo, deinde Alani atque Huni 
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He never elaborates on this statement, and nothing in the rest of his history 
seems to provide a context for the mutual slaughter of two diff erent Gothic 
groups, just as there is no known event where Alans and Huns fought each 
other.40 I propose, therefore, that this conundrum can be resolved by con-
necting it to Orosius’s report on Radagaisus’s defeat:
Against, Radagaisus, our most savage enemy (immanissimum illum hostem), 
God granted that the minds of other enemies (aliorum hostium . . . animi) 
should be disposed to help us with their forces. Uldin and Sarus, leaders of 
the Huns and of the Goths, came to the aid of the Romans. But God does not 
allow the workings of His power to appear as the valor of men, particularly 
when they were our enemies.41
Scholars have often assumed this means that Sarus and Uldin were regular 
allies whom Stilicho engaged against Radagaisus. Orosius’s use of hostium 
could refer to their barbarian identities, thus casting them in their broader ste-
reotypical guise in Roman discourse, but in this particular context they were 
actually regarded as allies from the start.42 However, it makes more sense 
to interpret this passage to mean that these were enemies of Rome, and had 
been from the start, but they suddenly decided to help the Romans instead. I 
propose, therefore, that Sarus was the leader of one the three main divisions 
into which Radagaisus had divided his army.
Certainly, the fact that Zosimus describes him as “pre-eminent among 
the allies for his strength and reputation” during Stilicho’s meeting with his 
barbarian offi  cers near Bologna in 408 supports his identiﬁ cation as one of 
Radagaisus’s most senior offi  cers from some point previous to this year.43 
This could be explained, however, if we assume that, after being reduced to 
starvation, Sarus and his men surrendered peacefully to Stilicho at Faesulae, 
uariis caedibus populabantur. For reasons unknown, Fear substitutes Vandals for Alani. This is 
incompatible with the original Latin (ed. Zangemeister, 1889).
40  Thompson 1948, 33, followed by Oost 1968, 75 n. 122 explains this as the Huns’ being 
responsible for pushing them out of their lands into Gaul. Yet they do not elaborate on the two 
Gothic formations. O’Flynn 1983, 39 regards it as a vague reference to “the uncontrollable behav-
ior of the barbarian allies” during Stilicho’s war with Alaric in Italy.
41  Oros. 7.37.12 (trans. Fear 2010, 398): conceduntur quidem aduersus immanissimum illum 
hostem Radagaisum aliorum hostium cum copiis suis inclinati ad auxilium animi. adsunt Uldin 
et Sarus, Hunorum et Gothorum duces, praesidio Romanorum; sed non sinit Deus rem potentiae 
suae uirtutem hominum ac maxime hostium uideri. 
42  See, among others: Stein 1968, 250; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 60; Ridley 1982, 215 n. 86; Lieb-
eschuetz 1990, 66; Williams and Friell 1994, 136; Croke 1995, 68; Blockley 1998a 121; Janssen 
2004, 190; Goff art 2006, 78; Halsall 2007, 207 n. 93. Demandt 1998, 115 confusingly describes 
Sarus as a “heidnischen Gotenkönigs”—a description that Orosius actually applies to Radagaisus. 
Heather 2005, 198 inexplicably sees Sarus as a leader of Alan auxiliaries.
43  Zos. 5.34.1.
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but that Orosius confuses this event— the surrender of part of Radagaisus’s 
force—with his ﬁ nal defeat which, as I will discuss later, actually occurred 
when he was besieging Florence.44 Following their surrender, Sarus’s men 
were then used to help defeat Radagaisus’s division as it besieged Florence.45 
This was the slaughter committed between “two formations of Goths,” but 
Orosius did not wish to dwell upon it, since it undermined his wider thesis 
concerning the bloodless nature of the victories enjoyed by a pious empire, the 
more signiﬁ cantly since it would have forced him to give credit to Stilicho. We 
shall return to this point later.
Uldin, Alaric, and the Alans
I turn next to Uldin. While discussing the events of 404/405, Sozomen reports 
that “the Huns crossed the Danube and devastated Thrace.”46 Though he does 
not name the leader of these Huns, it is widely assumed that this was probably 
Uldin, the ﬁ rst named Hun leader in Europe.47 Already in 400, he had aided 
the government in Constantinople by defeating the last forces of the renegade 
general Gainas and delivering his head to Arcadius. Because he also assisted 
Stilicho later against Radagaisus, scholars often treat him as a regular Roman 
ally until his raid into Thrace in 408/409.48 However, given that he seems to 
have been raiding eastern Roman territory in the Balkans in 404, it is more 
credible to interpret Orosius’s description of him as one “of our enemies” in 
the most literal sense. I would argue that, at this point, Stilicho sought the aid 
of the Gothic king Alaric to guard Illyricum before then persuading Uldin to 
come to the western empire’s assistance also.
Given that Alaric had already served as western Roman commander in 
405, some scholars have noted his absence in the war against Radagaisus.49 
44  This is a departure from scholarly opinion that usually interprets Faesulae as the location 
of Radagaisus’s ﬁ nal defeat; see PLRE 2: 934, “Radagaisus”; Mazzarino 1942, 280; Demougeot 
1951, 359; Jones 1964, 184; Oost 1968, 75; Stein 1968, 250; Matthews 1975, 274; Ridley 1982, 
215 n. 86; Paschoud 1989, 22; Burns 1994, 198; Williams and Friell 1994, 156; Blockley 1998b, 
431; Demandt 1998, 115; Lee 1998, 234; Wood 1998, 518; Janssen 2004, 193; Heather 2005, 
205; Ward-Perkins 2005, 188; James 2009, 55; Merrils and Miles 2010, 34; McEvoy 2013, 175; De 
Jaeghere 2015, 302; Wijnendaele 2015, 19.
45  Note that Paulin. V. Amb. 5.10 and Addit. ad Prosp. Haun. s.a. 406 both place Radagaisus’s 
defeat at Florence. 
46  Soz. 8.25.1. 
47  PLRE 2: 1180, “Uldin”; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 62–63; Blockley 1992, 53 n. 5.
48  Thompson 1948, 37–38; Williams and Friell 1994, 156; Heather 2005, 196.
49  Goff art 1988, 153 merely notes that Alaric “kept quiet” during Radagaisus’s invasion. Wil-
liams and Friell 1994, 155 surmise that he probably remained out of the conﬂ ict because he still 
had not recovered from the losses sustained during his own invasion of Italy in 402. Liebeschuetz 
1990, 66 and Burns 1994, 198 think that Alaric was simply too far away to assist. However, if 
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The reason for this was simple: he was not recalled to Italy because he was 
actively guarding the western Illyrian provinces during Uldin’s raids on 
nearby eastern Roman provinces.50 Indeed, Olympiodorus speciﬁ cally states 
that “Stilicho had summoned Alaric to guard Illyricum for Honorius.”51 Oro-
sius’s description of Uldin as one of the “enemies disposed with their forces to 
help us” makes considerable sense in this context. In 405, the west did not yet 
have any links with the Huns. However, it is probable that Stilicho sought an 
alliance with Uldin as a consequence of his need for allies against Radagaisus.
The very fact that Uldin’s Huns had previously raided eastern Roman 
territory means that they could not be regarded as regular auxiliaries. Uldin 
will have become an ally only after he had ﬁ rst been paid and received hostag-
es.52 The negotiation between western Romans, Alaric, and Huns will have 
required extensive diplomacy and time, time during which Alaric had to stay 
put and “guard Illyricum,” while Uldin passed through the diocese with his 
forces on the way to Italy. Indirectly, Stilicho was doing the eastern empire a 
great favor by drawing away a previously hostile leader from their borders. 
This may help explain why relations between both courts improved greatly 
throughout 405 and 406.53
When Uldin ﬁ nally arrived in Italy, his ﬁ rst task was “the slaughter of the 
Alans by the Huns,” vaguely referred to by Orosius above. I suggest that these 
Alans were the third group in Radagaisus’s horde as referred to by the Gallic 
Chronicler of 452, and that their destruction is mentioned by Zosimus in the 
following passage:
Previously, in the sixth consulship of Arcadius [Probus was his colleague in 
406], the Vandals, after joining themselves with the Sueves and Alans and 
having crossed these places, ravaged the provinces beyond the Alps. They 
wrought such slaughter and became so formidable even to the armies in Brit-
ain, that they compelled them, under fear they might turn against them too, 
to elect usurpers, namely, Marcus, Gratian, and in addition to these Con-
stantine. And when there was a great battle with him (πρὸς ὃν), the Romans 
were victorious and killed most of the barbarians, but by not pursuing those 
who ﬂ ed (in which case they would have annihilated them), they allowed 
a Hun force led by Uldin could make it to Italy all the way from the lower Danube, surely Alaric 
could have done the same.
50  Heather 2009, 26–28 also suggests that Stilicho solicited Alaric’s aid during Radagaisus’s 
war in 406. 
51  Olymp. fr. 6.
52  Gordon 1949, 65; Demougeot 1951, 357.
53  In contrast with the situation in 404, both courts recognized each other’s consuls (Bagnall et 
al. 1987, 344–347). Furthermore, the inscription celebrating Radagaisus’s defeat was proclaimed 
on behalf of both emperors (CIL 6.1196 = ILS 798).
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them to recover from their defeat, muster a multitude of barbarians, and 
make ready for battle again. 54
Some scholars have interpreted Zosimus’s “Roman victory” above as the defeat 
by the British usurper Constantine III of the barbarian groups who invaded 
across the Rhine and into Gaul in 407.55 However, in his magisterial edition 
of Zosimus’s history, Paschoud has argued persuasively that there are seri-
ous problems with this interpretation.56 The ﬁ nal book in Zosimus’s history 
saw far less revision, and considerably more confusion, than previous sections 
in his work. First, Zosimus nowhere speciﬁ es the location of this battle. It is 
particularly noteworthy that Zosimus does not even mention the Rhine, nor 
even Germania, anywhere here. Secondly, he does not actually state that a 
British usurper was responsible for this victory. Indeed, a close reading of the 
ancient Greek strongly disallows for the possibility of πρὸς ὃν referring to Con-
stantine III, since that would make him the leader of the barbarians who the 
Romans defeated! Thirdly, immediately after this passage Zosimus goes on to 
describe how Constantine III barred the Cottian Alps against further barbarian 
entrance, even though he had previously stated this was a precaution taken after 
an Imperial counteroff ensive from Italy in early 408.57 For all these reasons, it 
is evident that this passage cannot be read line by line as faithfully transmit-
ting the advance of Constantine III in Gaul. The most plausible reconstruction 
is that the ﬂ eeing barbarians were actually a remnant of Radagaisus’s third 
force, primarily composed of Vandals and Alans, who ﬂ ed across the Alps from 
northern Italy into Raetia.58 It is arguable, therefore, that this Roman victory 
54  Zos. 6.3.1–2 (trans. Ridley 1982, 128, emended): Ἑν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι χρόνοις, ἕκτον ἤδη τὴν 
ὕπατον ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν Ἀρκαδίου καὶ Πρόβου, Βανδίλοι Συήβοις καὶ Ἀλανοῖς ἑαυτοὺς ἀναμίξαντες τούτους 
ὑπερβάντες τοὺς τόπους τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὰς Ἄλπεις ἔθνεσιν ἐλυμήναντο, καὶ πολὺν ἐργασάμενοι φόνον ἐπίφοβοι 
καὶ τοῖς ἐν Βρεττανίαις στρατοπέδοις ἐγένοντο, συνηνάγκασαν δέ, δέει τοῦ μὴ κἀπὶ σφᾶς προελθεῖν, εἰς τὴν 
τῶν τυράννων ὁρμῆσαι χειροτονίαν, Μάρκου λέγω καὶ Γρατιανοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις Κωνσταντίνου. Πρὸς ὃν 
μάχης καρτερᾶς γενομένης ἐνίκων μὲν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, τὸ πολὺ τῶν βαρβάρων κατασφάξαντες μέρος, τοῖς δὲ 
φεύγουσιν οὐκ ἐπεξελθόντες (ἢ γὰρ ἂν ἅπαντας πανωλεθρίᾳ διέφθειραν) ἐνέδωκαν αὐτοῖς ἀνακτησαμένοις 
τὴν ἧτταν καὶ βαρβάρων πλῆθος συναγαγοῦσιν αὖθις ἀξιομάχοις γενέσθαι.
55  Bury 1923, 189; Kulikowski 2000, 333 n. 51; Heather 2005, 210 n. 42; Halsall 2007, 212 n. 126.
56  Paschoud 1989, 28–30.
57  Zos. 6.2.6, 6.3.3.
58  This suggestion was already made by Edward Gibbon and has been reaffi  rmed by Paschoud 
1989, 22; Drinkwater 1998, 273; and Birley 2005, 458–59. Birley 2005, 459 and McEvoy 2013, 
177 see these survivors as crossing the Cottian Alps into Gaul—hence diff erentiating them from the 
Rhine invaders of 406/407. Paschoud 1989, 22–23 and Drinkwater 2007, 324 note that these two 
routes are not mutually exclusive and that diff erent remnants could have ﬂ ed across both the Cot-
tian and Julian Alps. I agree with this suggestion but would emphasize the role of survivors cross-
ing the Alps into Raetia, where they had previously swept away any defenses and kept marauding 
until they could link up with the unscathed Sueves. Kulikowski 2000, 326–31 proposed re-dating 
the Rhine invasion to 31 December 405, advancing upon earlier arguments made by Baynes 1922, 
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over barbarians was that of Stilicho against the ﬁ rst host of Radagaisus’s forces 
as reported by the Gallic chronicle and vaguely referred to in Orosius.59
Vandals and Alans had already been present near Raetia in 401, when Stili-
cho ﬁ rst had to quell their raids.60 When Radagaisus marched through Pannonia 
and Noricum, they could have easily joined him. Together with other groups 
from the Danubian basin and the “Celts and Germans” mentioned earlier by 
Zosimus, they could have constituted the third group whom Stilicho probably 
destroyed in Liguria with Uldin’s help. Most importantly, Zosimus states that 
Stilicho took “as many auxiliaries as he could get from the Alans and the Huns” 
near Ticinum before marching on Radagaisus’s main army. Therefore, Zosimus 
corroborates Orosius’s description of Huns’ slaughter of Alans and the Gallic 
Chronicler of 452’s description of Stilicho’s Huns as slaughtering a third divi-
sion of Radagaisus’s army. Stilicho could not prioritize hunting down ﬂ eeing 
bands, since he had to march swiftly further south to subdue Sarus’s host and 
vanquish Radagaisus’s main force. One group of survivors ﬂ eeing over the Cot-
tian Alps may have triggered the ﬁ rst panic that set in motion the usurpations 
in Britain. However, the survivors of this slaughter, ﬂ eeing back from northern 
Italy across the Julian Alps to the Danubian basin, reached the nearest location 
where they could “recover from their defeat, muster a multitude of barbarians, 
and make ready for battle again.” We are then in a better place to understand 
the dynamics behind the breach of the Rhine frontier in 406/407.
The Defeat of Radagaisus
After dealing with the Alans, Stilicho and Uldin will then have steadily driven 
Sarus’s Gothic force into the Apennine hills and starved them to surrender 
near Faesulae. The three groups then converged on Radagaisus’s main force 
besieging Florence, as narrated by the Copenhagen Continuation of Prosper:
In the ﬁ fth year of the consulship of Stilicho and Artemius, after the entry of 
Alaric there followed another army of Goths and King Radagaisus entered 
and devastated Italy. In the next year Stilicho with an army consisting of the 
ﬂ ower of the soldiers attacked them at Florence of the Tuscans and, battle 
being joined, Radagaisus was defeated and captured and was decapitated 
before the gates of the city.61
218–19. Kulikowski 2007, 217 n. 37 concedes, however, that Birley might be correct in arguing for 
the traditional date of 31 December 406. 
59  Birley 2005, 458–59 also believes that Zos. 6.3.2. refers to a victory achieved by Stilicho but 
thinks that it is the one at Faesulae. 
60  Claud. De bello Get. 363–403.
61  Addit. ad Prosp. Haun. (marg.) s.a. 406 (trans. Muhlberger 1984, 73): Post Alarici introitum 
sequitur alius exercitus Gottorum et rege Radagaiso Italiam ingressus Italiam vastat. contra quem 
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That Radagaisus was defeated at Florence is also conﬁ rmed by Paulinus of 
Milan’s life of Ambrose:
[A]t the time when Radagaisus was besieging the above-mentioned city [Flor-
ence], when the citizens had despaired of their safety, [the spirit of Ambro-
sius] also appeared to a certain man and promised that safety would come 
to them the following day. When the report was received, the spirits of the 
citizens were revived. And the next day, upon the arrival of comes Stilicho 
with an army, victory was gained over the enemy.62
The other sources are all in agreement that Stilicho annihilated Rad-
agaisus’s main force. Indeed, the western Roman magister utriusque militiae 
needed a decisive military victory for political reasons. After the battles of 
Verona and Pollentia, Claudian had had to deﬂ ect ﬁ erce criticism against his 
patron that Alaric had been able to retreat to safety with quite a large army 
still intact. Radagaisus had devastated northern Italy for more than half a 
year, and there was a widespread belief that Rome itself was threatened.63 
Nothing but the total destruction of his main army would have ensured that 
Stilicho’s position remained unchallenged after the war.
Finally, it is important to note that it was entirely consistent with prece-
dent for Stilicho to have sent Sarus’s Gothic soldiers ﬁ rst against Radagaisus’s 
main force, and Uldin’s Huns to engage the Alans, while he kept his Roman 
troops in reserve to have them join battle only after all barbarian parties 
had exhausted each other ﬁ rst.64 After all, this is what he had witnessed his 
patron Theodosius do at the battle of the Frigidus in 394.65 It is for this reason 
that Augustine could claim, with only slight exaggeration, that “no Roman 
soldier lost his life.”66 It is important once again to emphasize that this was 
not the bloodless victory described by Orosius. Orosius desired not to say 
anno sequenti Stilico cum exercitu et robore militum apud Florentiam Tuscorum urbem occurrit 
commissoque proelio Radagaisus victus et captus est et ante portas civitatis capite truncatus.
62  Paulin. V. Amb. 10.50 (trans. Lacy 1952, 62): [T]empore quo Radagaisus supradictam civita-
tem obsidebat, cum iam de se penitus desperassent viri civitatis ipsius, per visum cuidam apparuit, 
et promisit alio die salutem illis adfuturam. Quo referente, civium animi sunt erecti: nam alterio 
die, adveniente Stilicone tunc comite cum exercitu, facta est de hostibus victoria.
63  Aug. Civ. Dei 5.23; Paul. Nol. Carm. 21.1–12; Zos. 5.26.4. Demougeot 1951, 356 interprets 
Radagaisus’s movements as being drawn to “la Ville éternelle” as if to an Eldorado because of its 
fabulous wealth. This is not impossible but is probably based on too literal a reading of the sources, 
who rather capture the anxiety of Rome’s elites about Radagaisus’s advance into Tuscany.
64  O’Flynn 1983, 40 also states that this happened during Radagaisus’s war but does not argue 
the case.
65  Oros. 7.35.19.
66  Aug. Civ. Dei 5.23. It has to be noted that the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve books of De Civitate Dei were already 
in circulation by 415 (Aug. Ep. 169) and thus predate Orosius’s work.
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anything about the slaughter of “the two formations of Goths” and “Alans 
and Huns” because they were major victories achieved by Stilicho. Indeed, 
Stilicho himself boasted on a public inscription that “the Gothic nation had 
been destroyed.”67
These observations have ramiﬁ cations for Orosius as the main source 
of the treatment of this campaign. His representation of Stilicho through-
out the ﬁ nal book of the Historia adversum paganos is unequivocally hos-
tile.68 Hence Orosius’s failure to even mention Stilicho’s name throughout 
his extensive treatment of the war versus Radagaisus cannot be a coinci-
dence.69 Rather than including him, and thus having to bear the onus of 
giving Stilicho credit for the ﬁ nal victory, Orosius cleverly casts diff erent 
protagonists as unlikely saviors, such as the former hostile leaders Sarus 
and Uldin.70 However, Orosius dexterously downplays the monumental-
ity of this military victory in his narrative through the intervention of 
the Christian God, who transformed the outcome into a divinely inspired 
“bloodless” victory, and he uses it as a prelude to Alaric’s later sack of 
Rome.71
Instead, the victory at Florence should ultimately be considered a coun-
terexample to the Roman defeat at Adrianople (378). It off ers clear proof of 
what the late Roman military could still achieve through logistics, strategy, 
and adroit diplomacy in conquering numerically superior groups of diverse 
ethnicities. Zosimus could rightly conclude that “Stilicho was very proud of 
this victory and returned with his army, universally honored for freeing Italy 
miraculously from such anticipated danger.”72
Ghent University
jeroen.wijnendaele@ugent.be
67  CIL 6.1196 = ILS 798: Imppp. clementissimis felicissimis toto orbe victoribus, DDD nnn. 
Arcadio Honorio Theodosio Auggg. ad perenne inidicium triumphorum, quod Getarum natio-
nem in omne aevum docuere extingui, arcum simulacris eorum tropaeis(que) decoratum s.p.q.R. 
totius operis splendore. . . . The last line probably featured Stilicho’s name and was erased after the 
supreme commander’s death and damnatio memoriae. 
68  Stilicho is ﬁ rst introduced as coveting imperial power for his son and assisting barbarians 
to break into the empire (7.37.1). Orosius is one of the very few ancient authors to abuse Stilicho 
for his Vandal heritage (7.38.1), and he even compares Alaric favorably to him (7.38.2). He then 
proceeds to accuse Stilicho of encouraging various barbarian groups to invade Gaul and Spain 
(7.38.3–4, 40.3), until Honorius and the Roman army kill him for his “crimes” (7.38.5). 
69  One should also note here Orosius’s failure to mention Stilicho when describing Alaric’s 
defeats and retreat from Italy between 401 and 403 (7.37.2). Here too, he prefers silence.
70  Jord. Rom. 321 and Marcell. com. s.a. 406.3 followed this Orosian tradition in the sixth century. 
71  Oros. 7.37.17.
72  Zos. 5.26.5. 
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